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NSC BRIEFING
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PROSPECTS FOR FORMOSA CEASE-FIRE

- I. Pattern of ChiCom conduct in the Formosa Strait slightly clarifying. However, new revolutionary regimes generally unpredictable, generally boisterous and always enjoy having a "foreign devil" to attack to help build up their internal situation. Hence ChiComs may move in unexpected manner.
- II These tendencies emerging:
 - A) Freeing of Formosa is now main ChiCom propaganda theme. Take-over of off-shore islands merely incidental and taken for granted.
 - B) ChiComs insist Formosa issue solely domestic matter and if they come to U.N., which possible but still uncertain, will contest its jurisdiction and propagandize for withdrawal U.S. Forces from Formosa.

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C) ChiComs putting pressure on U.K., India,

Burma, etc. to effect that U.S.A. policy will

lead to war and no compromise possible.

MAO long talk Finnish Amb. Sam Line

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IV. Possible that ChiComs will deliberately maintain tension for many weeks without forcing issue except for sporadic raids for attempt take over small islands believing that if tension allowed continue, U.S.A. [^] Allies will intervene to modify U.S. position on off-shore islands. During period tension ChiComs will ^{probably} attempt avoid large scale hostilities with U.S. and tangling with U.S. Naval Air Power in coastal area. ^{db} Intelligence Community deems it unlikely that ChiComs would deliberately attack U.S. forces engaged in evacuation Tachen garrison. This accords with Molotov's remark to Hearst 28 January, [^] ~~that if Chiang chose to withdraw his forces from any island "hardly anyone would try to prevent him from doing so."~~

DETAIL ON MOLOTOV - HEARST/SMITH EXCHANGE

1. ^{Kingbury} Smith asked: What is USSR attitude toward temporary cease-fire to permit Chi Nat troops to withdraw from islands?
2. Molotov replied: If Chiang desires withdraw troops from any island, "hardly likely anyone would try to prevent" this.**
3. Hearst & Smith asked: Does this mean ChiCom troops would not attack withdrawing forces or ships used in withdrawal?
4. Molotov replied: Not authorized to speak for Peiping.
5. Smith asked: Is USSR prepared to put this question to Peiping?
6. Molotov replied: Is US Government asking us to do this? (Soviet version of talk makes it appear Smith was asking on behalf US Govt.)

**Also reported as
"hardly anyone...",
omitting the word
"likely."

IV. Moscow attitude gives lip support to ChiCom position and ~~possibility~~^{to} facilitates their coming to U.~~A.~~ but exerts⁵ restraining influence.

VI. ChiCom military situation substantially unchanged - could attack any one of ~~small~~ islands in Tachen or Matsus group with very little prior warning.

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Mig 17 - now observed on Chia Hsing
VII. Chicom's unprepared invasion Quemoy byt apparent construction tunnel network in hills near Amy.

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